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.IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
State of Utah

State of Utah,

Plaintiff,
)
(
)

-vs-

II 8158

DICK SMITH,
Defendant.

OEFENDANT•s BRIEF
ON APPEAL
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complaint was filed against Dick Smith, the
appellant, on October 28th, 1953, charging him with

the crime of pondering committed as follows: "That
Dick Smith the above named defendant, in Weber
County, State of Utah, between November 1, 1951
and March 20, 1952 committed a felony, to-wit:
Pandering as follows, Dick Smith, induced, persuaded,
encouraged, inveigled and enticed a female person,
Norma Lee Stone, to become a prostitute ...
Preliminary examination was had October 31st,
1953, a Court Reporter being present and making o
transcript of the testimony, defendant was bouncl over
to the District Court where an information was filed
Novernber 19th, 1953, to which defendant pleaded
"not guilty" November 23rd, 1953, and trial was set
for November 30th, 1953. The information charged
the defendant with the crime of pandering, committed
page 1
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:ss folio•.vs:

11

Dick Smith having heretofore been

duly committed by Charles H. Sneddon, a com•
mitting magistrate of this County to this Court, to
answer this charge, is accused by the District
Attorney of this Judie ial District, by this information, of the crime of pandering committed as
follows, to-wit: Dick Smith induced, persuaded-,
encouraged, inveigled and enticed a female person, Norma Lee Stone, to become a prostitute."
From the conviction of the appellant to the
iury and the imposed sentence this appeal is
taken. Discussicn of the evidence so far as it re·
lates to the questions which this appeal raises will
be mode os the various motters upon which defen-

dant relies are discussed.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The argument in this case will follow the
points below given.
Page 2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Point No. I.
That the Court committed error in denying the
defendant~s

motion to dismiss the prosecution, made

at the close of the State's case, and based upon the
ground that the on Iy witness whose testimony connected the defendant with the alleged offense was
Norma lee Stone, whose testimony was not su£Rcient
to convict without corroboration.
Point No. 2.
That the Court committed error in that it refused
to give the defendant's requested instruction No. I
(Tr. 008) relating to necessity of corroboration of an
accomplice.
Point No. 3.
Error committed by the Court in rulings sustaining obiections made, and orders by the Court made
without obiection by the prosecution, limiting evidence sought to be adduced by defendant.

Page 3
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ARGUMENT
Point No. 1
11

That the Court committed error in denying

the defendant's motion to dismiss the prosecution,
made at the close of the State's case, and based
upon the ground that the only witness whose testimonv connected the defendant with the alteged
offense was Norma Lee Stone, whose testimony,
was not sufficient to convict without corroboration. 11
It is the contention of the defendant thdt Section 77-31-14 1 Utah Code Ann. 1953, became
applicable to this case 1 upon the prosecution proffering evidence that Norma lee Stone 1 the complaining witness, was a previously chaste person.

The statute cited provides as follows:
upon a trial for procuring or
attempting to procure an abortion, or
aiding or assisting therein, or for inveigling, enticing, or taking away
any female of previously chaste char11

page 4
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acter for the purpose of prostitution,
or aiding or assisting therein, the
defendant shall not be convicted
upon the testimony of the woman
upon or whh whom the offense was
committed, unless she is corroborated by other evidence. 11

It will be observed that this enaetment is not
limited to one class of offenses but is intended as
an extension of the general statute respecting
conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice, under whieh sueh a woman, since
not herself subiect to prosecution for the same
offense as that charged, would not be an accomplice. It would apply to every case where the
offense proved is inveigling or enticing such a
female for the purpose of prostitution. The word
"taking" has relation to the offense defined in
Section 76-53-20, which makes such o taking of
such a female from her parents or other lawful
custodian, she being under the age of 18 years, a

page 5
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felony. The provisions of Section 77-31-14 do not
contain that age I imitation.
This enactment was intended to enlarge the
definition of an accomplice by including in the class

of persons whose testimony required corroboration
females of previously chaste character who are enticed or inveigled into a life of prostitution. It is
to be observed that the only section of our penal
code which makes prior chastity an element of an
offense is Section 76-53-20, which has to do with
taking for the purpose of prostitution such a chaste
female, under 18 years of age, from the custody of
a parent or guardian, the latter two elements not
being included in the provisions of Section 77-31-14.

The latter statute includes 11 taking" as an alternative
element, but does not include 11 inveigling or enticing", words found in the pandering statute, (Sect.

76-53-10).
page 6
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If then this statute, so extending the necessity of corroboration to witness not ordinarily falling within the definition of on accomplice is to be
read giving meaning to all of its phrases, it must
be understood as covering all sexual cases involving prostitution, where the complaining witness
has been previously chaste, pondering included.
Chastity being no element of such other offenses,
it is submitted that the statute is rendered meaning-

less unless it is intended to apply where it appears in
the trial that the witness was chaste prior to the enticement of the defendant, and so must apply whether the charge. contains on allegation of such
chastity or not.
What are the facts here? The opening statement of the public prosecutor contains a recital of
the facts which he intended to prove to estobl ish

the State's case. The recital shows a visit by Mrs.
page 7.
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Stone to Smith's living quarters, where they drank
together, and where, she said, he first "began
making remarks about her becoming a prostitute 11 •
After that, said the prosecutor, the defendant
took Mrs. Stone home, and 11 further enlightened her
upon this subiect, and asked her her desires in the
matter and told her some of the advantages of be·
coming a prostitute 11 •

Then the statement related

continuing efforts along the same I ine, which after
some period of time resulted in her engaging in acts
of prostitution both in Utah and Wyoming. This
statement clearly indicates that the state based its
charges upon an enticement whose beginning dated
back to that first visit to the defendant's quarters at
the Millstream Motel. The statement was followed
up by testimony from Mrs. Stone which also began
with that motel visit, and followed through her
narrative of her relations with the defendant in subpage 8.
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stantially similar order as that given in the opening
statement. The witness then testified

(Tr~

. 21) that

she never had engaged in prostihJioon prior to meeting Mr. Smith -- not in direct statement perhaps of
chastity, but since she had told at length of illicit
relations with Smith, we think may be treated as,
and was considered by the witness and iury as meaning that, prior to those relations, she had been a
chaste woman.
There is nothing in the record which in any wise
tends to connect the defendant with the crime involved. The witness Arlyn Garside, the complaining witness in this case, testified (Tr. 24) to seeing Mrs.
Stone and Mr. Smith talking in Louigi's Cafe--a
fact to which Mrs. Stone had testified; that he saw
her in the Grill Cafe working as a waitress at a time
when Mr. Smith came to see him about getting a beer
I icense for that cafe; that she disappeared for a time,
page 9.
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and he thereafter saw her about town with other
men; and that subsequently (Tr. 25) he had converstitions with her at her request. The witness L. J.
Jacobson (Tr. 26) testified to seeing Mrs. Stone and

the defendant together in the same cafe, and riding
together in a car. None of these facts corroborate

the testimony of Mrs. Stone as to any oct of any
kind incidental to the offense charged.
The witness Jean Orlob, a sister of the witness
Stone, testified to visits to her home (Tr. 22) by her
sister and the defendant, and to some conversation
in which "joking" the defendant said something to
the effect that her sister could "make more rather
than working in a restaurant", that all she recalled
was that the defendant hod said that her sister could

get _further
.~onsider

than just working in a restaurant. To

such testimony, charocterized by the wit-

ness as "ioking", evidently so said that her sensibilipage 10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties were not shocked, and the incident barely remembered, as corroboration of the charge of entice•
ment to prostitution, would resuh in a rule of evidence
exposing any suitor of a woman, subsequently iilted,
to conviction upon her evidence of Hlici.t relations,
without any showing of opportunity or other facts except presence together in various places where no
chance for guih could arise, plus bad taste in conversation.
Corroboration must go further. This Court has
frequently defined such corroboration as being proof
of material facts which constitute a necessary element
of the crime charged.

State v. Spencer, 15 U. 149, 49 P. 302
Tending to implicate the defendant in and connect him
with the offense charged.
State v. Collett, 20 U. 290, 58 P. 684

The many cases cited in the footnote to Section 77-31--1-8,
page 11
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Utah Code Ann. 1953, which is the general statute
as to testimony of accomplices continue to support
the rule laid down in the two eorty cc;tses above
cited.
Point No. 2.
11

That the Court committed error in that it re-

fused to give the defendant's requested Instruction
No. 1 (Tr. 008) relating to the necessity of corroboration of an accomplice".
The argument given under Point No. I covers
this point; also, it should be noted that in
State v. Hall, 112 U. 272, 186 P.2d.

970
this Court ruled that where the testimony of an accompl ice was in the record, failure of the Court to
instruct on the need of corroboration even though
no request was made by defendant's counsel for
such an instruction, nor any exception taken to its
omission.
page 12
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Point No. 3
...frror committed by the Court in rulings sustoining obiections made, and orders by the Court

made without obiection by the prosecution, limiting evidence sought to be adduced by defendant. "
Defendant sought (Tr. 19) to interrogate Mrs.
Stone on cross-examination as to some incident
which had occurred in connection with her visit to

the office of the father of Defendant's counsel . fn
laying a foundation the following occurred: (Tr.

19)
"0. Did you go to my father's office
about a year and a half ago?
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Dobbs, that
is privileged testimony and there is
no use asking that.
Q.

Your Honor, there is no privileged
testimony if there was no clientattomey relationship.

THE COURT: Apparently you asked if
she is a client, and she said "no".
Now you are asking if she went to
page 13
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solicit you as a client.
Q.

I'm not asking her that. I'm
just asking if she went to see my
father.

THE COURT: Well, I'm barring the
testimony on the ground of Clientattorney relationship."
The conduct of the Court imp I ied without evidence 1 that the visit of the witness to the offices
of the father of defendant's counsel, was a visit to
a lawyer--perhaps a matter of iudic ial notice--but
went further by assuming, after the witness had
affirmative I y testified that she had never been a
client of either the father or of counsel, that necessarily a relationship of Client-Attomey arose from
the mere evidence of a visit. She was not even permitted to answer a question which was pre I iminary in
character 1 one laying a foundation for further evidence which counsel was barred by the Court from
entering into. The action by the Court was without
page 14
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ground, not based upon any cbiection of the prosecution, and preiudicial to the defendant.
Subsequently (Tr. 19 - 20) the following took
place:
"Q

Mrs. Smith (Stone), who was
the officer that contacted you
in relation to this action?

A Mr. Garside.
Q.

Have you talked to Mr. Garside
quite a bit about this matter?

A. Considerable.

he told you would hap•
pen to you if you didn't testify?

Q. What has

MR. RICHARDS: I obiect to this,
Your Honor, on the grounds it's
outside of the direct examination.
If counsel wants to make her his
witness on his case, that is agreeable, but as to this part it's
improper.

THE COURT: The obiection is sustained to the form of the question ...
The obiection was improperly sustained. A
page 15
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party to I i tigation of any eharac ter may e rossexamine an opposing witness as to matters tending
to show bios, duress, or other matters tending to
prove that the testimony was not freely given, without undertaking the burden of making a witness, pre•
sumably hostile, his witness.
11

A witness may be cross-examined as to

irrelevant matters in order to discredit
his testimony by what he himself may
state in answer. In fact this line of inquiry is the principal factor in establishing cross-examination as one of the chief
agencies for development of the truth
in iudic ial inquiries. By means thereof
the relation of the witness to the cause
or the parties, his bias or interest, if he
has any, his character for truth and
veracity, indeed any collateral foe t
which may bear on his truthfulness and
impartiality, may be brought to I ight.
Any question, although irrelevent or
remote, may be p\lt if it reasonably
tends to explain, contradict, or discredit any testimony given by him, or to
test his accuracy, memory, veracity or
credibility. It is always permissible on
cross-examination to lay a foundation
for impeaching the witness by proof of
prior contradictory statements."
(58 Am. Jr. 346 - 341)
page 16
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There simply is no authority which supports
any right of the Court to require a defendant to
make an adverse witness, particularly the aggre ived
herself, his witness for the purpose of such impeachment, yet this is exactly what happened in this
case. Obviously the question was foundational,
intended to elicit from the witness an answer indicating thot her testimony had been induced by
sorne threat or promise of the officer named. He
had already testified (Tr. 25) to his talk with her,
at a time a month before the tri-al, and iust prior
to the filing of the complaint before the committing magistrate, October 28th, 1953 (Tr. 001).
To refuse defendant the right even to lay a foundation for impeachment by a showing of duress,
threats, promises, or other action inducing the
complainant, obviously was error.
Again after Mrs. Stone had been recalled for
page

17.
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further examination, the following took place at the
inception (Tr. 33-34) of her cross-examination:
"Q. Mrs. Smith. At the pre I iminary

hearing, when you were being
questioned as to this money, five
or six thousand dollars, you stated
--Mr. Richards asked you how
much of that money has he returned
to you.
nANSWER: Nothing.
QUESTION: Did you ever ask for it?
ANSWER: Just----."
MR. ANDERSON: I obiect to this~
Your Honor on the grounds it's
improper cross examination.
Counsel is reading into the record
the record of the pre Iiminory hear•
ing. If he is trying to impeach
this record 1 we have no obiection
him trying to do that.
THt COURT: If you ara going to use for
impeachment, you've got to ask the
impeaching question first 1 Mr.
Dobbs.
Q Your Honor,

I am not particularly
trying to impeach her. I'm iust
trying to find out why she is testifying differently.
page 18.
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THE COURT: That is impeachment.
If you want to impeach her testimony, you w iII have to ask her
impeaching questions. 11

The impeaching questions had already been
asked, Mrs. Stone had testified (Tr. 16) that she
had testified at the preliminary examination, in
front of a reporter. The foundation for her impeachment by the record of her former testimony
had been laid. The Court while insisting that
impeaching questions must be asked, hal ted counsel in the very act of asking such questions.
Counsel, to complete the record, called
Mrs. Stone as a witness for the defendcm,t. Mrs.
Stone again testified (Tr. 38) to having been a
witness at the preliminary examination, and the
following took place:
"Q~

You testified at that time -· will ,
you tell me if these were the words
that you used?

MR .. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

page 19.

iect to this as being leading.
THE COURT: Well, the only purpose
you would have would be impeaching questions, so you haven't
asked an impeaching question.
You were advised to ask your impeaching questions if you want to
bring this in.

I think I have al·
ready made the impeaching ques-

Q. Your Honor,

tions on her first testimony and
brought part of the record in. I
don't know why it should be obiectionable now.
THE COURT: You only brought part
of the record in before it was ob•
iected to. But the only thing you
have now is to impeach her. If
you will state your impeaching
questions which you now wish to
impeach her on. I don't recall if
you did ask her.
later, while a witness for the defense# Mrs.
5tone did testify to threats that she might lose the
custody of her child, made by Officer Garside,
(Tr. 41) and the following took place:
"Q.

Did he also say had a chance of
being prosecuted for prostitution?
page 20
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MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I obiect to that.

THE COURT: Why are you obiecting
at this late date?
MR. ANDERSON: The statute protects
her on this score.
THE COURT: Well, I know. You
didn't obiect before.
A. Do I answer?

THE COURT: No. f told you, Mr.
Dobbs, you had to tell the person
and pi ace , and not just anyone -the time and place in order for
her to answer those questions. "
So defendant was barred from interrogotion, even after he had made Mrs. Stone his
own witne55, upon a matter whose materiality as
showing her bias and preiudice was evident.
The nature of the testimony sought to be
elieited by these various attempts of counsel to
impeach Mrs. Stone •s testimony had been made
known to the Court in the opening statement of

page 21
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defendant's case, (Tr. 6) the statement being
thot the defendant's case rested upon the question
of whether Mrs. Stone had been coerced into prosecuting by members of the City Police Force, and
that the iury ultimately must decide whether Mrs.
Stone was telling the truth, or lying because she was
forced to I ie .
This Court has time and again made references
to the nature of the burden which a defendant must

bear when charged with sezuol offenses, and where
the sole proof of the offense, and the sole proof of
his innocence, must rest upon the belief which the
testimony of the woman, and the man, and has
approved the rule that under such circumstances,

the evidence of the complaint must be received
with great caution, and that the widest crossexamination is permissible.
State v. Mills 249 P. 2d. 211, - U page 22
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State v. Reese, 43 U. 447,

135 p. 270
Morris v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 241,
131 p. 731
Williams v. State, 61 Okl. Cr. 396,

68 p. 2d 530
Under exactly similar circumstances, where
prejudice had been aroused (Tr. 46, 47, 48) by
elicitation from defendant that one of his sources
of income was playing punchboards, where he had
been asked numerous questions as to relations with
other women, of a character obviously intended to
arouse in the minds of the ;ury on inference that he
had been guilty of pandering in other instances, where
the Court hod permitted, over defendant's obiection,
the introduction of testimony of such other offenses,
the denial by the Court of the right of impeachment,
both on direct and cross-examination could hardly
fail to be pre iudic ial to the defendant.
The Court's attention is directed to the bring•
ing in of inadmissible matter both by cross-examinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

page 23

ation of the defe• .t and reception of evidence
from Norma lee Stone (Tr. 55-56), and Arlene
Berrett (Tr. 57) as to payments of the proceeds of
prostitution, over the obiection of the defendant.
On cross-examination the prosecution had asked
defendant as to his ever having received the proceeds of prostitution from fallen women, particularly including (Tr. 48 et. seq.) Arlene Berrett
and "the Iady who formerly was your wife",
Helen Smith. Obiections by defense counsel to
these questions were overruled, and the questions
were answered negatively by the defendant. On
rebuttal, (Tr. 55) Mrs. Stone was again recalled,
allowed to testify (Tr. 56) to seeing Helen Smith
pay money to the defendant which she had earned
in prostitution with no effort made to ascertain
any possibility of the witness being able to give
any answer not based upon guess work; and Arlene
page 24
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Berrett was called upon to testify (Tr. 58 - 59)
that she had paid moneys to Dick Smith that she
had earned in prostitution. The witness thereafter
(Tr. 60) refused to answer upon the constitutional
ground to which Senator McCarthy takes much exception, as to her having been a pra&litute. She
was also permitted to answer (Tr. 59) that she
had seen Helen Smith pay moneys to Dick Smith
which she hod earned in prostitution, and when
the defense counsel obiected to the question
upon grounds of want of proof that Helen Smith
was a prostitute, the Court erroneously ruled
that the answer might be made, because that
identical question had been asked the defendant,
and such receipt by him denied, in spite of total
want of proof that Mrs. Smith was a prostitute.
In fact on the basis of the testimony of Norma
Lee Stone and Arlene Berrett the witness Helen
poge 25
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••

Smith was prosecuted in the District Court in
and for Weber County for the crime of Periury
and was acquitted. In fact the whole reason
for the production of the testimony, that so preiudiced. the cause of the defendant so badly, was
for the sole and only purpose of laying a basis
for such charge of perjury.
This Court has commenc ted in "State v.
Hougesen, 91 Utah 351 1 64 P. 2d 229, upon
the wide variances of viewpoint among appellate
courts as to how far proof of independent crimes
may be adduced by cross-examination of a defendant 1 and in the opinion in which aft Jus•
tices of the Court concur 1 there are laid down
rules under which such questions are admissible,
and under which answer to this type of question
addressed to Mr. Smith would be enforced or
excused in the sound discretion of the Court
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(pg. 238) as answers going to the credibility of
the witness, even though not relevant nor material to the offense then on trial before the Court.

A different question presents itself when the
attempt is made to impeach the defendant by
testimony as to such matters irrelevant to the
pending prosecution.
"Regardless of whether, for the purpose of impeachment of a witness, a
scope of an inquiry is confined to
general reputation for veracity or extended to general moral character,
the authorities are quite uniform in
holding that the character of a witness
may not be impeached by independent
proof of particular acts of immorality
or of wrong doing; that is a witness
may not be discredited by testimony
of other witnesses or by independent
e~idence as to particular incidences
of misconduct. Such evidence is reiected because of the confusion of
issues and waste of time that would be
involved and because the witnesses
cannot know what charges may be made
and cannot be prepared to expose their
falsity. 11

(58Am. Jr. 411-12)
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.. The answers of a witness on crossexamination with reference to matters
relevant to an issue are not conclusive
and may be contradicted by independent
proof for th' purpose of impeachment.
But it is firmly established that the
answer of a witness on cross-examination as to Cf merely collateral matter
is binding pn the cross-examinee, and
may not be contradicted. The principal reasons of the rule are, undoubtedly,
that but for its enforcement the issues
in a cause would be multiplied indefinitely, the real merits of the contro•
versy would be lost sight of in the mass
of testimony to immaterial points, the
minds of iurors would thus be perplexed and confused, and their attention wearied and distracted, the costs
of litigation would be enormously
increased, and iudic ial investigations
would become almost in terminable. "

(58 Am. Jr. 433)
"As to whether matter is collateral
within the rule precluding proof of the
falsity of testimony concerning facts
collateral to the issue, the test is
whether the fact shown by the answer
could be shown in evidence for any
independent purpose, or whether the
cross-examiner would be allowed on
his part to prove the matter. If so,
then the matter may be contradicted.
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This test is not infallible, and does
not apply to the impeachment of a witness by showing that he has been conficted of a crime or is biased."
(58 Am. Jr. 433- 434)
~~------lt may be regarded as settled,
however, that the answer of a witness
to questions regarding specific acts
which would show his past conduct,
antecedents, and character, or to
questions which tend to disgrace him,
are final and cannot be contradicted ..• "

(58 Am. Jr. 434)

"The rule precluding a cross examiner
from contradicting by other evidence
answers to questions relating to collateral matters has been frequently applied
in criminal cases. Indeed, a violation
of the rule in such a prosecution may
constitute preiudicial error. - - - - - 11
(58 Am. Jur. 435 - 436)

None of the offenses, as to which such
cross examination was had or such rebuttal
made, were matters in any wise connected with
the crime charged in the information. They tended
in each case to be as to matters as to which the
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defendant could not be prepared to expose the
falsity of the statements, they were offered and
admissible solely for the purpose of discrediting
the character of the defendant, and we urge that
admission of thi$ testimony over the objections of
defendant was highly preiudicial to his cause before the i ury.

CONCLUSION
Upon the matters herein discussed, the defendant by his counsel submits that the defendant's conviction should be reversed and the defendant granted the new trial for which he moved.

(Tr. 012).
Respectfully submitted,

DOBBS & DOBBS
Counsel for Defendant
812 Eccles Building, Ogden, Utah
By

----~H~U~G~H~E~.~D~O~B~B~S----

of Counsel
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